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Many of the models and procedures for planning, 
management, and resource allocation are based on the 
assumptions of rational decision making. However, the 
administrative reality of most institutions is not 
completely rational. Administrative reality is a mix of 
rationality, bureaucracy, and politics. Administrators 
develop theories of action to explain and govern their 
behavior in their organizations. 
This study presents a theoretical definition of power: 
the ability to shape or. stymie the behavior and/or beliefs of 
others. It argues that power is defined in terms of its 
sources, bases, and instruments. Several studies of the 
relationship between power and resource allocation at large 
research universities are analyzed. In each analysis there 
is a significant relationship between power and resource 
allocation. 
The procedures for the development of an explicit, 
coherent, and flexible theory of action are discussed. 
The study presents recommendations for the development of a . 
user-oriented metatheory for the practice of administration 
in higher education and recommendations for the curriculum 
of the in-service and the formal education of administrators 
in higher education. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Higher education has entered a period where both its 
internal and external environments are becoming increasingly 
more complex, and each institution has the responsibility and 
the opportunity to shape its own future (Mayhew, 1979) 
(Carnegie Council, 1980). The effectiveness of an 
institution's administration is one of the major factors 
in determining how bright the institution's future will be. 
Institutional vitality, viability, and even survival 
depend on the timely interaction of established and 
tested procedures and processes, wise human skills 
and abilities, and fortunate vagaries of history . 
.. . Thus, the first step toward gaining, regaining, 
or retaining institutional vitality is the establishment 
of an administrative structure that preserves for 
the central administration the needed prerogatives of 
implementing effective policies and assuring that 
subordinate units of the institution behave in fiscally 
responsible ways, while at the same time allowing for 
orderly consultation with all members of the academic 
community. (Mayhew, 1979, p. 27) 
Effective planning, management, and resource allocation 
are essential in dealing with the problems of changing 
missions, retrenchment, and program revision and development 
in higher education. The overall purpose of this study is to 
explore the relationship between power and resource 
allocation in institutions of higher education and to begin 
the development of a user-oriented management theory. 
~tatem~n! Qf !h~ ~roblem 
Many of the models and procedures for planning, 
management, and resource allocation are based on the 
assumptions of rational decision making (Micek, 1980) 
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(Orwig & Carruthers, 1980) (Leslie, 1984). However, the 
administrative reality of most institutions of higher 
education is not completely rational. The goals and purposes 
are not always clear; alternatives are often not clearly 
defined; actions are implemented that do not optimize the 
stated goals of the institution. Administrative reality is a 
mix of rationality, bureaucracy, and politics. The 
prescriptive models that administrators are taught do not 
match the organizational realities that administrators must 
face. One of the major discrepancies is the failure of the 
prescriptive models to deal explicitly with the issues of 
power and influence. 
Because of the discrepancies between the prescriptive 
models and organizational reality and the general 
socialization in the culture, many administrators espouse an 
acceptable prescriptive model but practice an implicit model 
that matches their assumptions about human nature and their 
organization. Since the model is implicit, it is usually not 
available for verification, even to those who use it. 
Consequently, individuals can not really test the 
effectiveness of their theories-in-use. (Argyris & Schon, 
1974) 
3 
This study primarily addresses two questions: 
1. How does power affect resource allocation in 
institutions of higher education? 
2. How does one conceptualize and assess power in 
institutions of higher education? 
Baldridge & Tierney (1979) evaluated an Exxon Education 
Foundation program called Resource Allocation and Management 
Program (RAMP). The program was designed to improve the 
management of private liberal arts colleges and universities. 
The goals of the program were clearly identified with the 
goals of the rational decision-making model. However, 
Baldridge & Tierney emphasized, "'l'he introduction of 
management innovations is a highly political process." 
(p. 10) Volkwein (1984) argued that the implementation of 
the individual decisions in the strategic planning process at 
the State University of New York was a difficult political 
process. Politics and power are intuitively obvious factors 
in resource allocation, but we need to understand how they 
interact with one another. 
Greenfield (1980) wrote: 
The point is that our theories create the facts that 
are relevant to them, and we can, therefore, only 
explore truth within a framework that defines what it 
is. (p. 29) 
Brunsson (1982) argued, "Perspectives determine what data are 
seen, what theories are developed, and what kind of results 
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turn up." (p. 29) Frasher & Frasher (1981) pointed out that 
a manager uses a naive psychology to make scm~ sense of 
organizational events. They called this naive psychology 
administrative attribution theory. This attribution theory 
attempts to provide a plausible explanation for the behavior, 
beliefs, and attitudes of the individual and other members of 
the organization. However, Kelley (1955) and Kelley (1972) 
argued that attribution theory limits and filters perceptions 
of reality. Weick (1969) made this point: 
The phrase "enacted environment" preserves the crucial 
distinctions that we wish to make, the most important 
being that the human creates the environment to which 
the system adapts. The human actor does not react to 
an environment, he enacts it. It is this enacted 
environment, and nothing else, that is worked upon by 
the process of organizing. (p. 64) 
How we conceptualize power and other variables of the 
organization will determine what we see. 
This study exa1nines the interaction between power and 
resource allocation in institutions of higher education. 
The data come exclusively from large, research universities 
and may limit the generalization of the results to smaller 
institutions with different missions. 
Hage (1972) argued that the major problems of theory 
development are really problems of metatheory, i.e., the 
underlying questions of when and how to apply theory. 
Consequently, this study emphasizes the work of Argyris & 
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Schon (1974) on theories of action because it addresses the 
the metatheory of practical administration. The study also 
emphasizes the general systems perspective because of its 
flexibility and breadth . 
. . . the rationalizing influence of general 
systems theory is expressed in its adoption of a triadic 
ontology which subsumes the relevant portions of all 
three traditional positions. In its simplest phrasing, 
we can suggest that there is no significant evidence 
to a priori restrict reality to either cognitive, 
empirical, or subjective (i.e. idiosyncratic) domain, 
and there is every evidence to suggest that knowledge 
(i.e. scientia) may be some product of all three 
domains. (Sutherland, 1973, p. 61) 
The basic research technique of this theoretical study 
is to examine and analyze the available references concerning 
decision making, power, theories of action, open systems, and 
resource allocation in higher education institutions. A 
related topics. Journal articles and books were located 
and various books on higher education administration, social 
psychology, and political science. 
Higher education institutions are complex organizations 
that are functioning in an increasingly heterogeneous and 
vacillating environment. Cohen & March (1974) argued that 
managers have much less control in an organization than most 
members of the organization would believe. They argued that 
unobtrusive management is the most effective tool 
administrators have. 
Unobtrusive management uses interventions of greater 
impact than visibility. Such actions generally have 
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two key attributes: (1) They affect many parts of the 
system slightly rather than a few parts in a major way. 
The effect on any one part of the system is small enough 
so that no one either really notices or no one finds it 
sensible to organize significantly against the 
intervention. (2) Once activated, they stay activated 
without further organizational attention. Their 
deactivation requires a positive organizational action. 
(Cohen & March, 1974, p. 213) 
Resource allocation can be a major tool in unobtrusive 
management. Mintzberg (1973) argued that the role of 
resource allocator is central to the control of the 
strategy-making process of the organization. It is important 
to understand how resource allocation actually occurs in 
institutions of higher education and the relationship among 
its rational, bureaucratic, and political determinants. 
Mintzberg (1973) inferred that managers carry an array 
of models in their memories to facilitate decisions. Argyris 
p 
& Schon (1974) called these models theories of action, which 
are composed of espoused theories and theories-in-use. 
Administrators in higher education need consonant and 
verifiable theories-in-use for their institutions. These 
working theories must allow the individuals and the 
organization to learn from experience. The dissonance that 
is created by espousing one theory of management and using 
1 
another tends to minimize commitment and creativity in 
complex organizations (Etzioni, 1961) (Davis, Strand, 
Alexander, & Hussain, 1982). Assessing and explicitly dealing 
with power in an organization can be a first step in 
developing a theory of action which has an explicit 
theory-in-use that is consistent with the espoused theory 
of the manager and the organization (Argyris, 1982). 
Des_:ign of the Study 
The remaining parts of this study are divided into five 
additional chapters. The second chapter reviews the 
literature on decision-making models, open systems theory, 
and power. The third chapter reviews a series of studies on 
the relationship between power and resource allocation. The 
fourth chapter addresses the concept of theory of action and 
deals with the perception and assessment of power. The 
summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study are 
in chapter five. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
De£i§iQn M~~ing Mog~l§ 
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Keen & Morton (1978) stated that the literature on 
decision making can be classified into five schools of 
thought: the rational manager, bounded rationality, 
organizational procedures, political interaction, and 
individual differences perspective. The rational manager 
viewpoint is based on the microeconomic assumptions of a 
clear separation of ends and means, a knowledge of all 
available alternatives and their outcomes, and well defined 
criteria for judgement. Bounded or limited rationality 
assumes that the role of the rational manager can still be 
pursued with limited and imperfect information. The 
organizational procedures school of thought concentrates on 
the standard operating procedures of the subunits of the 
organization. Political interaction focuses on the 
personalized bargaining that occurs between the 
organizational units and accepts the idea that power and 
influence determine the outcome of any decision. The 
individual differences perspective concentrates on the 
individual manager and his or her problem-solving and 
information-gathering behavior. This section of the study 
addresses limited rationality, organizational procedures, and 
political interaction. The individual differences 
perspective will be addressed in a later chapter and the 
omniscience that is required of the truly rational manager 
is not currently possible in higher education. 
Cyert, Simon, & Trow (1956) made this point: 
In economics and statistics the rational choice process 
is described as follows: 
1. an individual is confronted with a number of 
different, unspecified alternative courses of action. 
2. to each of these alternatives is attached a set of 
consequences that will ensue if that alternative is 
chosen. 
3. the individual has a system of preferences or 
11 utilities 11 that permit him to rank all sets of 
consequences according to preference and to chose that 
alternative that has the preferred consequences. 
(p. 237) 
They argued that several elements are missing from the 
9 
economic rational model in its application to decision making 
in organizations. The problem is often not given; it must 
be identified and defined. The alternatives are usually not 
given for nonroutine decisions; they must be developed. 
Consequences are not given; they must be projected. 
Moreover, the comparisons among the consequences of the 
various alternatives are done with numerous criteria. They 
urged a modification of the rational choice model. 
Our illustration suggests that search processes and 
information gathering processes constitute a significant 
part of decision-making and must be incorporated in a 
theory of decision if it is to be adequate. (Cyert, 
Simon, & Trow, 1956, p. 248) 
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Simon (1957) accepted the idea that it is often difficult 
to separate means from ends in rational decision making and 
that the "rationality" of the various criteria that are used 
in the selection of alternatives is related to the various 
value systems involved. He described the purpose of limited 
rationality this way: 
Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global 
rationality of the economic man with a kind of rational 
behavior that is compatible with the access to 
information and computational capacities that are 
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the 
kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. 
(Simon, 1957a, p. 241) 
He argued that the dominant problem-solving techniques that 
a human being used were determined by habit. However, he 
believed that organizations can affect the perception and the 
problem-solving strategies of their members through 
socialization. 
Human rationality operates, then, within the limits of a 
psychological environment. This environment imposes on 
the individual as "givens" a selection of factors upon 
which he must base his decisions. However, the stimuli 
of the decision can themselves be controlled so as to 
serve broader ends, and a sequence of individual 
decisions can be integrated into a well conceived plan. 
(Simon, 1957, pp. 108-109} 
This belief assumes an exceptionally successful socialization 
of the members in the norms and values of the organization. 
Cyert & March (1963) accepted the idea that 
organizational decisions can be made with limited 
rationality, but they did not accept the assumption of an 
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exceptionally successful socialization. They argued that the 
decision making of organizations is based on four relational 
concepts and the first relational concept is the 
quasi-resolution·of conflict over goals. The other concepts 
are uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search, and 
organizational learning. 
Cyert & March (1963) stated that many organizations 
function with contradictory goals. The organizations 
never really resolve the conflict among diverse goals; they 
simply address the goals sequentially. Organizations 
attempt to avoid uncertainty by focusing on short-term issues 
and by negotiating with the environment to make it more 
predictable. The search for solutions is usually motivated 
by a specific problem. The individuals searching for the 
solution are usually biased by their training, experience, 
and goals and start their search with the simplest methods 
first. If the search for a solution is unsuccessful and the 
organization can determine that the search is unsuccessful 
the organization can learn by either modifying its search 
procedures, modifying its decision rules, modifying its 
attention rules, or modifying its goals. 
Cyert & March (1963) assumed that organizational 
learning is an aggregate of the learning of individuals in 
the organization. This assumption implies that the 
members of the organization accept the local rationality 
implicit in the pursuit of a particular goal, that the 
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members develop essentially the same information from the 
feedback from the environment, and that they are able to 
change the standard operating procedures of the organization. 
Rubin (1977), in a study that attempted to test hypotheses 
of Cyert & March (1963), found that under environmental 
pressures some organizational members no longer choose to 
adapt or to optimize their behavior. Brunsson (1982) argued 
that if the standard operating procedures are concerned 
with initiating action, then the decision-making process will 
often deviate from normative rationality, i.e., searching for 
alternatives and estimating consequences is minimized. 
Political Interac!i2n 
Initiating action is the major emphasis of this 
viewpoint. Keen & Morton (1978) described it this way. 
Here decision making is seen as a personalized 
bargaining process between organizational units. Those 
who hold this view argue that power and influence 
determine the outcome of any given decision. (p. 63) 
Allison (1971) argued that decision making as a political 
process had three characteristics: (1) the goals and values 
involved are diverse; (2) competing groups are identified 
with each of the goals and/or policies; (3) the relative 
power of the groups is as important as if not more important 
than the strength of their argument in the determination of 
the final decision. A person's rationale for the selection 
or the support of a particular alternative is based on the 
individual·s location in the organization. 
Bacharach & Lawler (1981) presented-five assumptions 
which they believed support the political process of 
decision making: 
1. Organizations are best conceptualized as political 
bargaining systems. 
2. Specific decision-making spheres are the primary 
arenas for bargaining and conflict in 
organizations. 
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3. Within decision spheres, most organizational 
politics involve the efforts of actors to mobilize 
interest groups and coalitions for the sake of 
influencing the decisions of those in authority. 
4. On the basis of collective objectives, interest 
groups merge into coalitions and select tactics 
to achieve their common objectives. 
5. The formation of coalitions and coalition alliances 
will depend on the nature of the organizational 
structures and the distribution and control of 
organizational resources. (p. 213) 
Bacharach & Lawler (1981) emphasized that coalitions are not 
necessarily groupings that have been created by the formal 
structure of the organization. They are social groupings 
that develop from natural groupings, i.e. interest, sex, 
race, as well as work groups. Bacharach & Lawler (1981) and 
Allison (1971) agreed that the makeup of the competing groups 
can change with the goals and issues that are being 
contested. The contest often continues even after a decision 
is made. 
Bardach (1979) argued that the outcome or impact of 
decisions are usually different from the goals of the 
decision because the relevant groups that are necessary for 
the implementation of the decisions are still involved in a 
political process that Bardach calls implementation games. 
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There are four basic categories of games: the diversion of 
resources, the deflection of goals, the dilemmas of 
administration, and the dissipation of energies. In the 
diversion of resources various players try to obtain the 
maximum in money, prestige, and benefits and to produce the 
minimum in terms of output. In the deflection of goals some 
of the players try to overload the original goal of the 
decision or to deflect the goal of the decision to their own 
purpose. The dilemmas of administration involve the system 
inertia that resists any change, and dissipation of energies 
involves the passive resistance or aggression of people 
involved in struggles of turf and ego. 
Eclectic Reality 
Each decision making model has different assumptions 
_which produce diverse perspectives. Which perspective is 
most effective? Allison (1971) argued that all three 
perspectives are useful. Limited rationality is useful in 
the creation of the decision criteria for the strategic 
planning process of an organization. Organizational 
procedures are a useful perspective in understanding how 
information is collected, how alternatives are produced, and 
how routine actions are taken. The political interaction 
perspective is useful in understanding any attempt to 
formulate goals or policy and any attempt to alter the status 
quo. Norris & Mims (1984) argued that the challenges facing 
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higher education in the 1980s require planning and management 
that, "incorporate the best aspects of rational and 
political decision making.•• (p. 706) Jedamus (1984) made this 
point about planning and management in higher education: 
Strategic planning involves the setting of policies, the 
choice of objectives, the selection of resources, 
long-range forecasting, and the evaluation of plans of 
action. Tactical planning (or management control) 
includes short-range forecasting as well as making 
decisions to assure effectiveness in the acquisition and 
use of resources. Operational control involves making 
decisions to assure the effectiveness in the conduct of 
operations .... All three types of planning and control 
are performed by faculty members, department heads, 
deans, chancellor, and governing board-though in 
different proportions-at each of the various decision 
centers. (p. 80) 
One theoretical perspective allows the integration of limited 
rationality, organizational procedures, and political 
interaction into one viewpoint and allows the perception of 
all the significant actors and forces that affect the 
organization. That perspective is open systems theory. 
Bertalanffy (1975) argued that the open system 
perspective can be traced to the Aristotelian world view that 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
As with every scientific theory of broader scope, 
general systems theory has its "metascientific" or 
philosophical aspects. The concept of "system" 
constitutes a new "paradigm", or, as the present writer 
put it, a "new philosophy of nature", contrasting the 
11 blind laws of nature" of the mechanistic world view 
and the world process as a Shakespearean tale told by an 
idiot, with an organismic outlook of the "world as a 
great organization 11 • (pp. 164-165) 
General systems theory is, as emphasized, a model of 
certain general aspects of reality. But it is also 
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a way of seeing things which were previously overlooked 
or bypassed, and in this sens~ it is a methodological 
maxim. (p. 168) 
Bertalanffy (1968) also presented an insightful warning 
concerning the use and application of general systems theory 
in management. 
Such knowledge can teach us not only what human behavior 
and society have in common with other organizations, but 
also what is their uniqueness. Here the main tenet will 
be: Man is not only a political animal; he is before and 
above all, an individual. The real values of humanity 
are not those it shares with biological entities, the 
function of the organism or the community of animals, 
but those which stem from the individual mind. Human 
society is not a community of ants or termites, governed 
by inherited instinct and controlled by the laws of the 
superordinate whole; it is based upon the achievement of 
the individual and is doomed if the individual is made a 
cog in the social machine. This, I believe, is the 
ultimate precept a theory of organization can give: not 
a manual for dictators of any denomination more 
efficiently to subjugate human beings by the scientific 
application of Iron Laws, but a warning that the 
Leviathan of organization must not swallow the 
individual without sealing its own inevitable doom. 
(pp. 52-53) 
Boulding (1956) took the general system concept, the world as 
a great organization, and divided the world into nine 
conceptual levels. In his framework each higher level 
subsumed all the characteristics of the preceding levels. 
The levels were as follows: 
1. Static structure - the level of frameworks and 
categories. 
2. Dynamic system- a simple system with predetermined 
necessary motions. 
3. Cybernetic system - a system with a thermostatic 
mechanism to maintain equilibrium. 
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4. Open system - a self-maintaining structure that 
exchanges with its environment; the level of cells. 
5. Genetic-societal system- differentiation appears 
among the subunits of the system; the level of 
plants. 
6. Informational system - characterized by increased 
use of information, purposeful behavior, and 
self-awareness; the animal level. 
7. Symbolic system - the ability to produce, absorb, 
and interpret symbols is the characteristic of 
this level; the human level. 
8. Social system - this level is characterized by the 
impact of roles, expectations, and values. 
9. Transcendental system - this level deals with the 
absolutes and ultimates that constitute the 
unknowables. 
Level eight was the foundation for much of the application of 
general/open systems philosophy to the understanding and 
management of organizations. 
Katz & Kahn (1966) argued that organizations are open 
systems that have nine common characteristics: 
1. Importation of energy- open systems import some 
form of energy from the external environment. 
2. Throughput - open systems transform the available 
to them. 
3. Output - open systems export some product to the 
environment. 
4. Systems as cycles of events - the pattern of 
behavior in the system has a cyclic character. 
5. Negative entropy - the open system uses energy to 
reverse its natural trend toward disorganization. 
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6. Information input - open systems not only receive 
energy inputs, but they also receive information 
about their internal functioning and the structure 
of the external environment. However, the 
reception of energy and information inputs is 
selective. An open system can only interpret the 
information inputs that it is coded to receive. 
7. Steady state - the importation of energy from the 
external environment maintains some balance in the 
exchange of energy. Equilibrium is maintained by 
the balanced exchange of inputs and outputs. 
8. Differentiation - the elements of an open system 
move in the direction of specialized functions and 
elaborations. 
9. Equifinality - a system can reach the same final 
state from different initial conditions and by a 
variety of paths. 
Katz & Kahn (1966) stated that most organizational theory and 
practice assume that social organizations are closed systems 
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and create some fundamental errors that are based on 
misconceptions of the organization. 
One error which stems from this kind of misconception 
is the failure to recognize the equifinality of the 
open system, namely that there are more ways than one 
for producing a given outcome .... Moves toward tighter 
integration and coordination are made to insure 
stability, when flexibility may be the more important 
requirement. (p. 26) 
A second error lies in the notion that irregularities 
in the functioning of the system due to environmental 
influences are error variances and should be treated 
accordingly ... , Open system theory, on the other hand, 
would maintain that environmental influences are sources 
of error variance but are integrally related to the 
functioning of the social system, and that we can not 
understand a system without a constant study of the 
forces that impinge on it. (p. 27) 
Katz & Kahn (1966) also made an interesting point concerning 
the boundaries of an open system and its various subsystems. 
They argued that the boundaries were selectively permeable. 
System boundaries refer to the types of barrier 
conditions between the system and its environment which 
make for degrees of system openness. Boundaries are the 
demarcation lines or regions for the definition of 
appropriate system activity, for admission of members 
into the system, and for other imports into the system. 
the boundary constitutes a barrier for many types of 
interaction between people on the inside and the people 
on the outside, but it includes some facilitating device 
for the particular types of transactions necessary for 
organizational functioning. (pp. 60-61) 
Haas & Drabek (1973) took the concept of selective 
permeability even further. They argued that the boundary of 
a system is really determined by the problem at hand, i.e. 
the boundary of an organization is conceptual not factual and 
needs to be placed where it allows the recognition of all the 
relevant elements that affect the particular problem. They 
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also argued that the relationship of a system with the 
external environment and the relationship among its various 
subsystems reflect differing layers of control and autonomy. 
Thompson (1967) took the concept of differentiation in 
function, structure, control, and autonomy and theorized on 
the relationship between open systems and rationality. 
Most of our beliefs about complex organizations follow 
from one or the other of two distinct strategies. The 
closed system strategy seeks certainty by incorporating 
only those variables positively associated with goal 
achievement and subjecting them to a monolithic control 
network. The open system strategy shifts attention from 
goal achievement to survival, and incorporates 
uncertainty by recognizing organizational 
interdependence with the environment. A newer tradition 
enables us to conceive of the organization as an open 
system, indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but 
subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing 
certainty . 
. . . With this conception the central problem for complex 
organizations is one of coping with uncertainty. As a 
point of departure, we suggest that organizations cope 
with uncertainty by creating certain parts specifically 
to deal with it, specializing other parts in operating 
under conditions of certainty or near certainty. In 
this case, articulation of theses specialized parts 
becomes significant. (p. 13) 
The majority of open systems applications to management 
are faithful to Boulding 1 s (1956) eighth level of analysis. 
They concentrate on roles, structure, values, and management 
process. They emphasize what Brown & Moberg (1980) called 
macrolevel issues as opposed to microlevel issues which 
emphasize motivation, communication, and group processes. 
They do not, as Bertalanffy urged, emphasize the uniqueness 
of the individual. Nightingale & Toulouse (1977) presented 
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an open systems theory of organization that attempts to 
integrate macrolevel and microlevel issues. Their conceptual 
framework has five variables: organizational environment, 
values, structure, process, and reactions-adjustments. 
Reactions-adjustments are the individual feelings and 
attitudes of organization members. Their study involved an 
analysis of 1,000 organization members in 20 
organizations. The 117-item questionnaire was given 
to the subjects at their organizations. The questionnaire 
items addressed the five variables. The results indicated 
not only a congruence among the macro- and microlevel 
variables but also reciprocal interactions among the 
concepts. Moorhead {1981) supported the same conclusion. 
His study involved 87 resident physicians from 
16 departments in a large hospital. His instruments 
were previously validated or standardized rating instruments 
or surveys. His results indicated that the macrolevel 
aspects of the organization, i.e., environment, values, 
structure, and intergroup processes, affect and are affected 
by the microlevel aspects of the organization, i.e., 
interpersonal processes and the reactions and adjustments 
of the organizational members. Both studies {Nightingale & 
Toulouse, 1977; Moorhead, 1981) indicated that a major 
process variable, which affected both macro- and microleve1 
variables, was power. 
The concept of power and i~s legitimate use have been 
debated since ancient times. Plato had Thrasymachus, the 
Sophist, make the following argument in the Republic: 
This then, my good man, is what I say justice is, the 
same in all cities, the advantage of the established 
government, and correct reasoning will conclude that 
the just is the same everywhere, the advantage of the 
stronger. (Grube, 1974, p. 13) 
Moreover, the debate continues unabated. Galbraith (1983) 
stated: 
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"power is the possibility of imposing one's will 
upon the behavior of others." This, almost certainly 
is the common perception; someone or some group is 
imposing its will and purpose or purposes on others, 
including those who are reluctant or adverse .... It is 
because power has such a common sense meaning that it 
used so_often with so little seeming need for 
definition. (p. 2) 
However, the number of various explicit and implicit 
definitions of power that are available suggest that 
something more than the common sense definition is needed. 
Dahl (1957) described power as a relationship among 
people. He did not differentiate between authority, power 
derived from a formal position in an organization, and 
influence, power derived from informal factors. He argued 
that the relationship has three properties: 
1. There must be some connection between the persons 
involved in the power relationship. 
2. There is a time lag between the actions by the 
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person who is said to exert power and the responses 
of the recipient of the power. 
3. The actions must have some statistical probability 
of success. 
Bacharach & Lawler (1981) argued that this last property 
implies that power only exists when it is successfully 
applied. Bierstadt (1950) made the same point. ~'Power is 
always successful; when it is not successful, it is not, or 
ceases to be, power." (p. 73) Also, Bierstadt (1950} made a 
distinction between power and influence. He argued that 
power is coercive and that influence is persuasive. I do not 
accept the argument that power is always coercive. Galbraith 
(1983} pointed out that one of the major instruments of 
power, conditioned power, is exercised by changing belief. 
Moreover, I do not accept the arguments that influence always 
involves persuasion and that power only exists when it works. 
Gamson (1968) argued that influence is the probable impact of 
all the resources that a person controls and can bring to 
bear on those he wishes to affect. Obviously, some of those 
resources may be coercive. In addition, it seems to me that 
Dahl (1957) did not imply that power only existed when it 
worked, but that the threat of sanction or reward must be 
taken seriously by the target of the threat or promise. 
It seems, however, that Dahl underestimated the impact of 
unthreatened sanctions or rewards on human behavior. 
Potential or even possible sanctions or rewards may have an 
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impact on some types of human behavior. Wrong (1968) argued 
this same point. 
Power is usually defined as the capacity to control 
others. Yet the capacity to perform acts of control and 
the actual performance are clearly not the same thing; 
power when thought of as a capacity is a dispositional 
concept .... Thus a mother has power over her child when 
the child refrains from doing something in-anticipation 
of her displeasure even when the mother is not present 
to issue a specific prohibition. Similarly, the 
President has power over congress when congressional 
leaders decide to shelve a bill in anticipation of 
presidential veto. (pp. 677-678) 
Wrong (1968) also supported the argument that power is always 
a relationship between two actors. However, he emphasized 
that it is not a directly observable social behavior, e.g., 
participation in the discussion of an issue is not power. 
Perrow (1970) argued that power in organizations is 
based on relationships, but the critical relationships are 
those among the various subunits of the organization. The 
relationships are determined by the specialization of the 
functions of the subunits. Crozier (1964) argued that the 
source of subunit power is the ability of the specialized 
unit to cope with uncertainty in the internal and external 
environment of the organization. Hickson, Hinings, Lee, 
Schneck, & Pennings (1971) also argued that 
intraorganizational subunit power is derived from the 
function of the subunits within the organization. They 
presented five hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The more a subunit copes with 
uncertainty, the greater its power in the organization. 
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Hypothesis 2. The lower the substitutability of the 
activities of the subunit·, the greater its power within 
the organization. 
Hypothesis 3a. The higher the pervasiveness of the work 
flows of the subunit, the greater its power within the 
organization. 
Hypothesis 3b. The higher the immediacy of the 
workflows of a subunit, the greater its power within the 
organization. 
Hypothesis 4. 
by a subunit, 
organization. 
The more contingencies are controlled 
the greater its power within the 
(pp. 220-222) 
They applied their hypotheses to the analysis of data that 
had been collected in an earlier study and they reached this 
conclusion: 
The concept of work organizations as interdepartmental 
systems leads to a strategic contingencies theory 
explaining differential subunit power by dependence on 
contingencies ensuing from varying combinations of 
coping with uncertainty, substitutability, and 
centrality. (Hickson et al, 1971, p. 227) 
They acknowledged two problems with the strategic contingency 
theory of intraorganizational power. First, the individual 
differences of the people in the various subunits will affect 
the power of the subunits. Second, The perception of power 
can be as important as the reality of power. Bacharach & 
Lawler (1976) made this same point in a later study. 
Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck (1974) ·took the same 
five hypotheses and used them in a study of twenty-eight 
subunits of three branch breweries in western Canada. Their 
results indicated that none of the five variables, coping 
with uncertainty, nonsubstitutability, pervasiveness, 
immediacy, and unpatterned variability, is a sufficient 
condition for high scores on a measure of intraorganizational 
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power; all of the variables must be present for a high score. 
Salancik & Pfeffer (1974) argued that intraorganizational 
power in higher education institutions is based primarily on 
the ability of the subunit to supply valuable resources to 
the organization. They also raised the question of the 
extent to which subunit power is based on criteria that are 
important to groups outside of the organization. Pfeffer 
(1978) accepted the work of Hickson et al. (1971), Hinings et 
al. (1974), and Salancik & Pfeffer (1974), but he argued that 
any consideration of subunit intraorganizational power must 
be done in the context of the power that flows from the 
hierarchical structure of the organization. Blau's 
survey of the organization of academic work emphasizes the 
importance of Pfeffer's point in higher education. Blau 
(1973) pointed out that 11 Universities and colleges have 
administrative structures that are similar to other 
bureaucracies 11 (p. 279). 
Schein (1977) accepted the arguments of Hickson et al. 
(1971) for the bases of intraorganizational power, but she 
argued that it is important not only to understand how the 
interpersonal power of the subunit head interacts with the 
intraorganizational power but also to understand the intent 
and means of the subunit heads. Schein (1977) argued that 
the intent of the unit head determines the nature of the 
means utilized. If the intent is personal and covert, the 
means will be covert. If the intent is organizational and 
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overt, the means will be overt. Without some understanding 
of the intent of the individual subunit heads, it is not 
possible to have an adequate understanding of the patterns 
of power within an institution. 
Mechanic (1962) raised another important consideration 
for understanding intraorganizational power: the sources of 
power of lower-ranking participants in complex organizations. 
He accepted the argument that power is closely related to 
dependence (Emerson, 1962) (Jacobs, 1974) and developed nine 
hypotheses to explain the sources of power of lower-ranking 
members of the bureaucracy: 
1. Other factors remaining constant, organizational 
power is related to access to persons, information, and 
instrumentalities. 
2. Other factors remaining constant, as a participant's 
length of time in an organization increases, he has 
increased access to persons, information, and 
instrumentalities. 
3. Other factors remaining constant, to the extent that 
a lower-ranking participant has important expert 
knowledge not available to high-ranking participants, he 
is likely to have power over them. 
4. Other factors remaining constant, a person difficult 
to replace will have more power than a person easily 
replaceable. 
5. Other factors remaining constant, experts will be 
more difficult to replace than nonexperts. 
6. Other factors remaining constant, there is a direct 
relationship between the amount of effort a person is 
willing to exert in an area and the power he can 
command. 
7. Other factors remaining constant, the less effort 
and interest higher-ranking participants are willing to 
devote to a task, the more likely are lower-ranking 
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participants to obtain power relevant to the task. 
8. Other factors remaining constant, the more 
attractive a person i~, the more likely he is to obtain 
access to persons, and control over these persons. 
9. Other factors remaining constant, the more central 
a person is to an organization, the greater his access 
to persons, information, and instrumentalities. 
(pp. 353-361) 
Bacharach & Lawler (1981) attempted to integrate the 
various conceptual viewpoints of power by differentiating 
the form and content of power. "Form refers broadly to the 
basic pattern or configuration of the phenomenon, such as the 
parameters within which action or interaction occurs. 11 
(p. 14) "Content refers to dimensions that are not 
omnipresent in empirical situations. Content is 
idiosyncratic and specific to the situation." (p. 15) 
Bacharach & Lawler (1981) argued that the form of power has 
three dimensions: the relational aspect, the dependence 
aspect, and the sanctioning aspect. 
The key point underlying the relational aspect of power 
is that, whatever the unit of analysis, we must attend 
to the interactional dynamics of power relationships 
... The power of the organization vis-a-vis its members 
becomes a question of how key actors or groups, such as 
organizational elites, interact with other subgroups 
within the organization. (p. 18) 
From the standpoint of the power-dependence theory, 
power is a function of dependence. More specifically, 
the power of an actor is a function of the other 
person•s dependence on the actor. The greater the 
other•s dependence on the actor, the greater the 
actor•s power in the relationship. (p. 20) 
The second dimension of dependence, outcome value, is 
generally treated as the importance of or the need for 
the outcomes in the social relationship. In other 
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words, the theory indicates that actors will attach 
values and priorities to the various outcomes obtained 
from the given relationship. The greater the value 
attached to the outcome of the relationship, the greater 
the power of the other; by the same token, the more 
value the other attaches to the outcomes, the greater 
the actor's own power in the relationship. (p. 21). 
While patterns of dependence are the parameters of the 
power relationship, the sanctioning aspect of power is 
a more integral part of the interaction process. It is 
the active component of the power relationship, 
referring to the direct manipulations of the other's 
outcomes. (p. 25) 
The content of power is authority and influence. 
They are differentiated by their bases and their sources of 
power. The relationship among the sources of power, the 
bases of power, and the type of power are presented in Table 
1. The bases of power are coercive, remunerative, and 
normative, i.e. the ability to control sanctions, rewards, 
symbolic rewards, and knowledge. The sources of power are 
structural position, personal characteristics, expertise, 
and opportunity. The bases of power are what enable people 
to manipulate the behavior of others. The sources of power 
are what enable individuals to control the bases of power. 
Structural position is the source of power for authority and 
provides for the control of the four bases of power: 
coercive, remunerative, normative, knowledge. Influence can 
have personality, expertise, or opportunity as a source and 
these sources give access to coercive, normative, and 
knowledge bases of power. Authority is a zero-sum type of 
power. The structure can only give a limited number of 
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Table 1 
Relationshi~ among !he Sou~~ Bases, and TYpes of ~owe£ 
Source Bases Types 
Structure Coercive Authority 
Remunerative 
Normative 
Knowledge 
Personality Normative Influence 
Knowledge 
Expertise Normative Influence 
Knowledge 
Opportunity Coercive Influence 
Knowledge 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981) 
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people the ability to make binding decisions. If one person 
gains authority, then another person has lost some authority. 
Influence, on the other hand, is not zero-sum. Personality, 
expertise, and opportunity are theoretically not finite. 
Consequently, the influence that one individual gains need 
not be the influence that another individual lost. 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981) 
Although they integrated many diverse theoretical 
constructs of power into their work, their definition of the 
form of power seems to narrow. Bacharach & Lawler (1981) 
argued that the form of power has only three aspects: 
relational, dependent, and sanctioning, but the sources of 
influence w~ich they identify--personality, expertise, and 
opportunity--implicitly suggest another aspect of power, the 
ability to persuade and change beliefs. 
Galbraith (1983) described three instruments of power 
and three sources of power. The relationship between the 
sources of power and the instruments of power are displayed 
in Table 2. Condign power is the ability to punish; 
compensatory power is the ability to reward; conditioned 
power is the ability to change beliefs and shape values. 
Personality is a source of conditioned power; property or its 
control is a source of compensatory power; and organization 
is a source of conditioned, compensatory, and condign power. 
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Table 2 
Pr!!!!5!!:Y RelatiQ!!Shi12_ !!!!twee!! ~Qurce~ ang !!!~!!:_uments of Powe!:_ 
Source 
Personality 
Property 
Organization 
Instrument 
Conditioned Power 
Compensatory Power 
Conditioned Power 
Compensatory Power 
Condign Power 
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As there is primary but not exclusive association 
between each of the three instruments by which power is 
exercised and one of the sources, so there are numerous 
combinations of the sources of power and the related 
instruments. Personality, property, and organization 
are combined in various strengths. From this comes a 
varying combination of the instruments for the 
enforcement of power. (Galbraith, 1983, p. 7) 
2!h~r~. The primary relationship among the sources, bases, 
and instruments of power for this definition is in Table 3. 
Location in the organization can provide access to all four 
bases of power. Property and the ability to provide 
valuable resources to the organization provide access to 
coercive and remunerative bases which support the instruments 
of sanction and reward. Personality provides access to the 
normative and knowledge bases which support the alteration of 
beliefs and values. Expertise allows access to the same 
bases and the same instrument as well as the instruments of 
sanction and reward. The nature of expertise allows its 
sharing or withholding to be used as a reward or sanction. 
Opportunity grants access to the coercive, remunerative, and 
knowledge bases of power and all three instruments of power. 
All power, even power whose source is the personality or 
expertise of an individual, is a function of relationships 
among the individuals involved in the organization and the 
dependencies and interdependencies that exist among them. 
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Table 3 
Source Base Instrument 
Organization Coercive Sanction/Threat 
Remunerative Reward/Promise 
Normative Alteration of 
Belief/Value 
Knowledge 
Property Coercive Sanction/Threat 
Remunerative Reward/Promise 
Personality Normative Alteration of 
Belief/Value 
Knowledge 
Expertise Normative Alteration of 
Belief/Value 
Knowledge Sanction 
Reward 
Opportunity Coercive Sanction/threat 
Remunerative Reward/Promise 
Knowledge Alteration of 
Belief/Value 
Clevenger (1982) made this point: 
There are different types of power structures in 
different institutions, and power in universities 
is a subsidiary aspect of the university's social 
structure. (p. 1.33) 
Gross & Grambsch (1974) argued that the social and power 
structure of universities seems rather stable. They 
conducted surveys of the administrators and faculty of 
approximately 80 public and private universities in 1964 
and 1971. They asked, among other things, who really has a 
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say in the major decisions that affect the institution. They 
assumed, given the campus turmoil of the late 60's, that 
there would be a significant difference between their 1964 
and their 1971 results. Their assumption was wrong; the 
results of both studies indicated that the senior 
administrators and the Board had the most say in what 
happened at the institution. Even at public institutions, 
they ranked higher than the legislature. The faculty was 
perceived as having 
perceived as having significant power, in some cases more 
than department heads. 
than department heads Students, despite some increase in 
1971, had less power than any group within the institution. 
I would argue that the power structures and the use of power 
in colleges and universities change very slowly because power 
and its effect on the institution are seldom assessed in 
relation to the effectiveness of the organization. 
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Galbraith (1983) argued that the alteration of belief is 
the instrument that is most frequently used in organizations. 
It assists in the creation of the zone of indifference which 
allows the members of the organization to accept many 
requests and orders with no question (Barnard, 1968). The 
threat of sanction, sanction, the promise of reward, and 
reward are used by interest groups in the organization as 
they form coalitions to pursue their interests (Gamson, 1968; 
Baldridge, ·1971; Baldridge, 1978; Bacharach & Lawler, 
1981). 
Pfeffer (1977) discussed the conditions that affect the 
use of power in the allocation of resources. The first two 
conditions are characteristics of the resource, scarcity and 
importance. Pfeffer argued that unless the resource was 
scarce, it was unlikely that a great deal of power would be 
expended to acquire the resource. Power was more likely to 
be used when conditions of greater resource scarcity exist 
in the organization. He also argued that resources varied 
in importance to the variouB subunits of an organization. 
It was unlikely that power would be used to contest a 
resource that is not important to the subunit. 
In order for power to be used in allocating resources, 
the resource must be both critical to most subunits 
within the organization and scarce as well. 
(Pfeffer, 1977, p. 249) 
Pfeffer's third condition involved the amount of discretion 
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the decision makers have in the allocation of the resources. 
Power was likely to be used only if some discretion was 
involved and the allocation decisions could be affected by 
influence attempts. Another condition was whether the 
situation is public or private. "Power is more likely to 
affect decision outcomes when decisions are made in private." 
(Pfeffer, 1977, p. 250) However, Pfeffer (1977) and Feldman 
and March (1981) pointed out that the more rational and 
legitimate criteria that are presented in public meetings are 
often only used to validate decisions that have already been 
made in private. Uncertainty is the last of Pfeffer's 
conditions; power is more likely to be used in conditions of 
uncertainty 
Galbraith (1983) argued that the use of power 
instruments, especially condign and remunerative power, tends 
to instigate the development of a countervailing power to 
balance or limit the condign or remunerative power. Benson 
(1977) argued that the process was really a dialectic of 
organizational change. He argued that the dominant social 
structure, which is constantly being created by the members 
of the organization, contains within it elements which try to 
limit or destroy the social structure itself. This conflict 
creates the opportunity for praxis, ''The free and 
creative reconstruction of social arrangements on the basis 
of a reasoned analysis of both the limits and potential of 
the present social forms.'' (Benson, 1977, p. 5) Bacharach & 
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Lawler {1981) made a similar point. They argued that the 
conflict generated by the power struggles among the various 
interest groups and coalitions provided the opportunity for 
innovations and change in organizations. Pfeffer (1981) 
argued that the use and acceptance of power actually changed 
its definition. 
The distribution of power within a social setting can 
also become legitimated over time, so that those within 
the setting expect and value a certain pattern of 
influence. When power is so legitimated, it is denoted 
as authority .... The transformation of power into 
authority is an important process, for it speaks to the 
issue of the institutionalization of social control. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to note that within 
formal organizations, norms and expectations develop 
that make the exercise of influence expected and 
accepted. (pp. 4-5) 
In other words, the use of an instrument of power, the 
alteration of belief or value, can affect over time the 
perception and expectations of all the instruments of power. 
Kamber (1984) made this point about the use of power in 
higher education. 
Whether by arrogance, a passion for'efficiency, 
or merely the desire to save precious working hours, 
administrators will always be tempted to simplify 
administration by arrogating more power to themselves. 
What they need to remember is that short-term goals 
achieved in this way are usually outweighed by long 
term losses in collegiality, faculty morale, and 
institutional consensus. Despite the proliferation of 
administrative chores and the increased importance of 
those chores to institutional advancement, the essential 
work of a college or university is still carried on by 
the faculty. (p. 96) 
Power and its use in higher education can affect institutions 
of higher education in a variety of ways. They can help 
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generate an environment for innovation and change and they 
can damage faculty morale and commitment to the institution. 
On the other hand, since individual and subunit power 
are derived from a variety of sources and bases and are 
applied through a variety of instruments, power can be 
affected by the internal and external environment of the 
organization. Moreover, administrators can affect access to 
some of the sources of power and can modify over time the 
centrality of others. It is important to begin to understand 
how power affects the functioning and is affected by the 
functioning of institutions of higher education. 
This study investigates the relationship between power 
and one of the critical functions of an institution, resource 
allocation. The next chapter reviews a group of studies that 
explore the relationship among rational, bureaucratic, and 
political criteria in resource allocation. Most of the 
studies seem to look at power in a relatively narrow 
perspective, i.e., with an emphasis on coercive and 
remunerative instruments, not the broader perspective that 
was presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
POWER AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Parsons (1956) argued that there are three types of 
decisions in the internal relations of an organization, 
policy, allocative, and integrative decisions. Policy 
decisions commit organizations to certain goals; allocative 
decisions distribute people and resources; and integrative 
decisions involve coordination, coercion, and inducement. 
All three types of decisions interact with one another. 
However, allocative decisions are the necessary conditions 
for the other two; i.e., little can be done without people 
and resources. 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1974) examined the allocation of 
resources at the University of Illinois over a 13-year 
period. They used a paradigm called paramorphic 
representation to analyze the organization's decisions. 
The important feature of this paradigm is that the 
determination of attribute weights is made by 
statistical analysis of actual decisions and by 
obtaining protocols of the decision process or by asking 
the individuals involved in the task what they think are 
the decision criteria. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974, 
p. 137) 
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It is possible to observe the decisions and also the 
values of those variables believed to be influencing the 
the decisions .... the relative influence of each 
independent variable can be assessed. (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1974, p. 138) 
Pfeffer & Salancik {1974) presented this hypothesis: 
It is the hypothesis of this study that organizational 
decision making and particularly resource allocation 
decision making, is a political process and can be 
explained by consideration of relative subunit power, 
as well as by the consideration of possible 
bureaucratic criteria. (p. 139) 
The dependent variable of the study was the proportional 
share of the general funds budget for each of the 29 
departments in the study. The general funds budget was used 
because general funds could be allocated with more discretion 
by administrators than restricted funds. The independent 
variables were two types of assessment of power, a survey and 
unobtrusive measures, and bureaucratically rational criteria 
for resource allocation. 
Each department head was asked to rate each department, 
including his own, according to how much power the department 
had within the university on an 8-point scale. The 
department head was told that power was the ability to affect 
decisions so that they conformed more closely to what the 
department wanted. Two measures of power were built from the 
survey. One measure with the "don't know" responses omitted 
and another with the "don't know" responses included as an 
indication of very little power. The unobtrusive measures 
were memberships on various university committees. 
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Because some of the committees haq control over the 
allocation of resources within the colleges and within 
the university, a powerful unit would want to have 
representation on the committees. Moreover, membership 
on the committees would provide the subunit with some 
additional power. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974, p. 141) 
The departments and the committees used in the arialysis of 
resource allocation are in Table 4. Committee membership 
was broken into four variables, representation on the 
university research board, representation on the budget 
committee, and representation on each of the 13 
committees. The five measures of power were analyzed with a 
Spearman rank-order statistic to test the validity of the 
measures. The correlations among the measures are in Table 
5. The validity of the unobtrusive measures seems to be 
supported since their correlations with the first survey 
rating of power are all significant at the .01 level or less. 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1974) conducted two types of cross-
sectional analysis on their data. In the first, they used 
the individual data points over the 13-year period. 
In the second, they used the average for each department for 
the 13-year period. In each case a regression 
analysis against the proportion of general funds received, 
representation on the research board, and representation on 
all committees had coefficients that were significant. This 
result indicated that power had a major influence over the 
the allocation of general funds. However, instructional 
workload was also significant in each regression. That 
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Table 4 
Departments and Committees Utilized in St~gy 2f Universi!Y 
~udget Allocations 
Departments 
Economics 
History 
Psychology 
Anthropology 
Political Science 
Sociology 
Geography 
Electrical Engineering 
Mechanical Engineering 
Physics 
Chemistry 
Mathematics 
Civil Engineering 
Aeronautical and 
Astronautical Engineering 
Geology 
Computer Science 
Classics 
English 
Spanish and Italian 
French 
Germanic Languages 
Dairy Science 
Home Economics 
Accounting 
Finance 
Architecture and Fine Arts 
Health Education 
Business Administration 
Animal Science 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974, p. 141) 
Committees 
Building program 
Non-recurring 
appropriations 
University research board 
Budget 
Student affairs 
Senate coordinating 
council 
Educational policy 
Executive committees of 
College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences 
Agriculture 
Engineering 
Physical Education 
Fine and Applied Arts 
Commerce and Business 
Administration 
44 
Table 5 
Correlations Among Measures Qf SUQ~~it ~QWe~ 
Power1 Power2 Resbd aCorn Budget Exec com 
Power1 .96* .62* .61* .46* .60* 
Power2 .66* .54** .42*** .53** 
Resbd .53** .57* .50** 
aCorn .52** .80* 
Budget .16 
Power1 represents interview data with don't know responses 
omitted 
Power2 represents interview data with don't know responses 
included as very little power 
Resbd represents representation on university research board 
aCorn represents representation on sum of all committees 
Budget represents representation on the budget committee 
Execcom represents representation on the respective college 
executive committees. 
*p<.001. 
**p<.Ol. 
***p<.05. 
Correlations are Spearman rank-order and tests of 
significance are one-tailed. 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974, p. 143) 
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was an indication of the major impact of a bureaucratic 
criterion on the allocation of resouFces. Pfeffer & Salancik 
concluded that bureaucratic criteria and power both affect 
the allocation of resources. 
Salancik & Pfeffer (1974) dealt with the same survey 
data from the University of Illinois and analyzed the sources 
of power. They asked the 29 department chairmen to 
rank six dimensions on order of importance each should have 
in allocating budgets to departments. The department heads 
were also asked to rank the importance of seven resources 
that the departments provided to the university. Table 6 
displays the average preference ranking and the average 
importance ranking for the criteria and the resources. 
The number of graduate students ranked first as a criterion 
for resource allocation and as a resource to the university. 
The amount of outside grants and contracts ranked fourth in 
importance and fifth in preference. Table 7 shows the 
correlations among the measures of power, both unobtrusive 
and survey, and the probable determinants of power. These 
correlations indicate that the most important determinant of 
subunit power is the provision of valuable resources to the 
organization. The proportion of restricted funds received 
and the proportion of faculty supported by restricted funds 
both had correlations with two of the measures of power at 
the .001 level of significance, and the proportion of faculty 
supported by restricted funds had a correlation with the 
Table 6 
Criteria and resources 
Number of graduate students 
Number of undergraduate students 
National rank or prestige of 
the department 
Amount of outside grants and 
Average 
preference 
rank 
2.12 
2.44 
2.97 
contracts 4.33 
Public visibility of departments 4.92 
Administrative and service 
contributions to the university 4.18 
Business and prof8~sional contacts * 
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Average 
importance 
rank 
2.22 
2.94 
2.85 
3.88 
4.42 
5.68 
5.95 
*This criteria or resources was not included in the 
preference measure. 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 459) 
Table 7 
Determinants of 
subunit power 
Proportion of 
restricted funds 
received 
Proportion of 
faculty supported 
Resbd 
.62* 
by restricted funds .77* 
Number of graduate 
students .66* 
Number of advanced 
graduate student 
instructional units .66* 
National rank in 
1969, adjusted for 
number of contending 
departments .47* 
Number of 
undergraduate 
instructional units 
taught .38*** 
Total instructional 
units .46** 
Interview 
based 
measure of 
power 
.72* 
.76* 
.62* 
.56* 
.66* 
.14 
.30*** 
aCorn 
.36*** 
.44** 
.38*** 
.26**** 
.43** 
.03 
.16 
Resbd represents representation on the research board 
aCorn represents representation on all committees 
* p<.001. 
** 
p<.01. 
*** 
p<.05. 
**** 
p<.10. 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 460) 
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third measure of power that was significant at .01 
Although this study addressed the probable determinants 
of power, it did not deal with either the bases of power or 
the instruments of power. However, one can speculate that 
the normative and kno~ledge bases were used and that the 
primary instruments were the ability to shape beliefs and 
values and the ability to reward/promise. The 
bureaucratically rational criterion of instructional 
workload did not appear in the preferred ranking of criteria 
and the number of graduate students was ranked at the top of 
the preference and importance criteria. The departments with 
the most outside resources were likely to attract more 
graduate students with the fellowships and grants that would 
be available in the department. The powerful departments 
were able to persuade the others that a criterion that gave 
them an advantage should be a criterion for the allocation 
of resources. Representation on the university research 
board, which made some allocation decisions, the contacts and 
special knowledge associated with that representation, and 
the overhead that was generated by the contracts and grants 
allowed the powerful departments to reward other units and 
individuals in the organization. 
Salancik & Pfeffer (1974) also addressed the issue of 
when power is used in resource allocation. They 
hypothesized: 
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For a resource critical to most subunits, the scarcer 
it becomes. the more power will be used as the basis for 
its allocation in the organization. (p. 464} 
As part of the interview process, the department heads in the 
study were asked to rank the following seven resources in 
terms of scarcity and criticality: 
1. graduate fellowships, 
2. research board grants, 
3. appointments to the Center for Advanced Study, 
4. summer faculty fellowships, 
5. computer money for faculty research, 
6. computer money for instructional use, and 
7. new courses. 
The top four resources in scarcity and criticality were used 
in a series of correlations with measures of power. The 
average rankings of the resources are shown in Table 8. The 
lower the number, the more scarce or the more critical the 
resource was thought to be. Graduate fellowships were 
identified as the the most critical and the most scarce of 
the seven resources. Three types of correlations, a simple 
correlation, a partial correlation controlling for objective 
criteria, and a partial correlation controlling for objective 
criteria and national reputation were done. The correlations 
are displayed in Table 9. The results of the correlations 
seem to support the hypothesis. The measures of power are 
more highly correlated with the more critical and scarce 
resources. Even in the partial correlation that controlled 
Table 8 
Resource 
University graduate fellowships 
research board grants for 
faculty research 
Summer faculty fellowships 
Appointments to the Center 
for Advanced Study 
(saiancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 467) 
Average 
criticality 
2.46 
3.00 
5.36 
5.75 
Average 
scarcity 
2.45 
3.20 
4.37 
3.89 
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Table 9 
Resource 
Simple correlations 
Graduate fellowships 
Research Board grants 
Appointments to the CAS 
Summer fac. fellowships 
Measures of Power 
Resbd 
.90* 
.85* 
.74* 
.31*** 
aCorn 
.44** 
.35*** 
.32*** 
.01 
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Interview-based 
measure of power 
.58** 
.56** 
.36*** 
.15 
Partial correlations, controlling for objective criteria 
.Graduate fellowships .83* .38*** 
Research Board grants .72* .22 
Appointments to the CAS .57* .10 
Summer fac. fellowships -.21 -.37*** 
Partial correlations, controlling for objective 
national ranking 
Graduate fellowships .90* .40**** 
Research Board grants .86* .27 
Appointments to the CAS .65** .04 
Summer fac. fellowships .04 -.41**** 
Resbd represents membership on Research Board 
aCorn represents membership on all committees 
CAS represents Center for Advanced Study 
*p<.OOl. 
**p<.Ol. 
***p<.05. 
****p<.10. 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 468) 
.25**** 
.32 
.18 
-.60* 
criteria and 
.26 
.32 
.00 
-.52*** 
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for objective criteria and national ranking, the correlation 
between graduate fellowships and one of the unobtrusive 
measures of power, representation on the university research 
board, was significant at the .001 level of probability. The 
university research board actually made allocation decisions 
concerning resources and with those resources went graduate 
fellowships. 
Hills & Mahoney (1978) also examined the relationship 
among the allocation of resources, power, and scarcity. They 
analyzed the budgets and other relevant information for 
30 budgetary units of the University of Minnesota, a 
large land-grant university. They focused on the time period 
between 1964 and 1975. Based on the increase of state 
appropriations they classified the years 1964-1970 and 1975 
as abundant years and the years 1971-74 as scarce years. 
Because so much of the budget at the University of Minnesota 
was determined by formula established outside of the 
institution they defined discretionary budget increment as 
the dependent variable in the study. They presented two 
hypotheses: 
1. Under conditions of relative abundance of resources, 
the allocation of discretionary budget increments will 
be predominantly a function of universalistic criteria 
and less a function of power. 
2. Under conditions of relative scarcity of resources, 
the allocation of discretionary budget increments will 
be predominantly a function of power and less a 
function of universalistic criteria. {Hills & Mahoney, 
1978, p. 457) 
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The budgetary units in the study are listed in Table 10. 
There is a mix of departments and schools, but they were the 
organizational units that received separate budget 
allocations between 1964 and 1975. The two measures of 
universal or bureaucratically rational criteria were relative 
workload and change in workload. The unobtrusive measures of 
power were representation on the committees of the University 
Senate, the existence of an external advisory board for the 
unit, and the amount of matching funds the University 
contributed to the grants that the unit received. The 
University Senate committees are listed in Table 11. 
Although some of the committees recommended resource 
allocation policy, none of them alloc~ted resources. 
Hills & Mahoney also included the previous budget in their 
correlation of the other variables. The correlation 
analysis for all of the variables in both the abundant and 
the scarce years are displayed in Table 12. The previous 
budget had a significant correlation with the discretionary 
budget increment in the abundant and the scarce periods. 
However, in the scarce period the correlation is negative; 
i.e., the bigger the previous budget, the smaller the 
discretionary budget increment in the scarce years. Relative 
workload had a significant correlation in both the abundant 
and the scarce periods and change of workload had a 
significant correlation in the scarce period. Committee 
representation and matching funds had no significant 
Table 10 
Agricultural Economics Department 
Animal Sciences Department 
Anthropology Department 
Art History Department 
Astronomy and Physics Department 
Chemistry Department 
College of Business Administration 
Economics Department 
Electrical Engineering Department 
English Department 
General College 
Geography Department 
History Department 
Journalism Department 
Library School 
Mathematics Department 
Philosophy Department 
Political Science Department 
Psychology Department 
Rhetoric Department· 
School of Architecture 
School of Forestry 
School of Home Economics 
School of Law 
School of Social Work 
School of Statistics 
Social Sciences Department 
Sociology Department 
Spanish and Portuguese Department 
Studio Arts Department 
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(Hills-&-Mah~ney~-1978~-p~-458)-----------------------------
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Table 11 
Standing University ~enat~ Committees Included in !his Study 
Academic Standing and Relations 
Committees 
Consultation 
Educational Policy 
Faculty Affairs 
Judicial 
Library 
Research 
Resources and Planning 
(Hills & Mahoney, 1978, p. 460) 
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Table 12 
Period of Abundant Resources (1964-1970, 1975) 
-----------------Prev~---Rei~----ch~-----------Adv.---- Match. 
budg. wkld wkld aCorn board funds 
Rel. workload -.036 
Ch. Workload .069+ .291+ 
a Com .411* .042 -.019+ 
Adv. board .070 -.232* .051+ .132* 
Mat. funds .093 -.230* .041+ .020 
Disc. budget .395* .213* .204+ .031 
Period of Scarce Resources (1971-1974) 
Rel. workload 
Ch. workload 
aCorn 
-.116 
-.005 -.046 
.406** .217** -.075 
.133 .089 .329** .055 
.127 -.261** .051 -.088 
.123* 
.097 .089 
.396** 
Adv. board 
Mat. funds 
Disc. budget -.199**-.067 .235**-.040 .369** -.061 
aCorn represents committee representation 
*p~.05. 
**p~.05. 
+Because of missing data "Ch. workload" must have a 
correlation coefficient of +or- .14 or larger to be 
significant at the .05 level. 
(Hills & Mahoney, 1978, p. 462) 
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correlations in either period. However, the existence of an 
advisory board had a signif~cant correlation in the scarce 
period. The regression of the discretionary budget increment 
on the previous budget, measures of power, and the 
universalistic criteria are displayed in Table 13. In the 
abundant period four variables--previous budget, relative 
workload, committee representation, and advisory board--had 
significant coefficients. However, the first two were the 
most influential, and committee representation actually had a 
negative coefficient. In the scarce period three variables--
previous budget, matching funds, and advisory board--had 
significant coefficients. However, previous budget and 
matching funds had negative coefficients and only advisory 
board had a strong positive influence on the discretionary 
budget increment in the scarce period. The regression 
analysis seems to support the hypothesis that in the 
allocation of resources universalistic criteria predominate 
in abundant periods and power predominates in scarce periods. 
Previous budget and relative workload were most influential 
in abundant periods and the existence of an external advisory 
committee was most influential during the scarce periods. 
However, there does seem to be a conceptual weakness in one 
of the measures of power. The variable matching funds 
underestimates the unit's ability to provide valuable 
resources to the organization. The matching funds variable 
really addresses the resources the institution provides to 
Table 13 
Regression Mod~l~ of Qisc~~!iQn~~y ~~gget Increments during 
X~ Qf ~bung~n! ang Sc~~£~ Re~~£~~ ~64-192£1 
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Variable Coefficient F Significance 
Years of Abundant Resources (1964-1979, 1975) 
Previous budget 
Relative workload 
Change in workload 
a Com 
Advisory board 
Matching funds 
.458 
.267 
.080 
-.187 
.137 
.091 
2 
46.08 
15.36 
1. 52 
7.58 
4.57 
2 :·oa 
R .270 
N = 232 
Years of Scarce Resources (1971-1974) 
Previous budget -.264 8.00 
Relative workload -.128 2.09 
Change in workload .108 1.50 
a Com .060 .40 
Advisory board .412 18.50 
Matching funds -.224 5.74 
2 
R = .238 
N = 120 
aCorn represents committee representation 
p~.05 
p~.05 
p>.05 
p~.05 
p~.05 
p>.05 
p<.OOO 
p~.05 
p>.05 
p>.05 
p>.05 
p~.05 
p~.05 
p<.01 
Note: Variable coefficients are standardized regression 
coefficients. 
(Hills & Mahoney, 1978, p. 463) 
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the unit to secure external funding. 
Pfeffer & Moore (1980) replicated the work of Pfeffer & 
Salancik (1974) on two campuses of the University of 
California System. The same 20 departments were involved 
on each campus and the same committees were used. The 
departments and the committees are listed in Table 14. The 
dependent variables in the study were the proportion of the 
budget received and the FTE faculty positions obtained. The 
independent variables were measures of departmental power and 
paradigm development. Departmental power was assessed 
through reputational surveys and through unobtrusive 
measures, representation on committees, proportion of grants 
accounted for by the department, and the proportion of 
enrollment accounted for by the department. The first 
measure, representation on committees, is related to 
opportunity as a source of power. The last two measures, 
proportion of grants and enrollment provided, are related 
to the provision of a valuable resource to the organization 
as a source of power. Paradigm development was measured by 
the parsimony of language in the dissertations that were 
completed in the departments and the integration of knowledge 
as indicated by the amount of sequencing of required courses 
for the major concentrations in the departments. Paradigm 
development is related to expertise as a source of power; 
however, Pfeffer & Moore treated it as a separate variable. 
Table 14 
Departments 
Anthropology 
Art 
Chemical Engineering 
Economics 
Electrical Engineering 
English 
French 
Geology 
German 
History 
Mathematics 
Mechanical Engineering 
Philosophy 
Physics 
Physiology (Biological Sciences 
at one campus) 
Political Science 
Psychology 
Sociology 
Spanish (Spanish and Portuguese 
at one campus) 
(Pfeffer & Moore, 1980} 
Committees 
Budget and planning 
Committee on committees 
Educational development 
Educational policy 
Graduate council 
Fellowships and 
scholarships 
subcommittee of the 
graduate council 
Committee on research 
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The hypothesized relationship among the variables is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Paradigm development directly 
influences grant and contract dollars and resource 
allocation, i.e., budget and faculty positions. Grant and 
contract dollars influence departmental power, as measured 
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by reputational survey and committee representation. Student 
enrollment directly influences departmental power and 
resource allocation. Both student enrollment and external 
funding are valuable resources to the institution. The 
regression analysis displayed in Table 15 seems to support 
the hypothesized relationship among the variables. The 
coefficient for paradigm development in the regression on 
grants and contracts was significant at the .01 level. The 
coefficient of enrollment was significant at the .10 level 
and the coefficient of grants was significant at the .01 
level in the regression on the reputational measure of power. 
The coefficients of both enrollment and grants were 
significant at the .01 level in the regression on committee 
representation. The coefficients of enrollment, committees, 
paradigm development, and the interaction of enrollment and 
paradigm development were all significant at the .05 level or 
lower in the regression on the proportion of the budget. In 
the regression on faculty the coefficients of enrollment and 
paradigm development were significant at the .01 level and 
the coefficient of committees was significant at the .10 
level. 
PARADIGM 
DEVELOPMENT 
GRANT AND 
CONTRACT DOLLARS 
STUDENT 
ENROLLMENT 
DEPARTMENTAL 
POWER -----------
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION 
~ig~ l· Model of power in decisions on budget allocations 
(Pfeffer & Moore, 1980) 
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Table 15 
Grants = -.043 + .00311*** Paradigm 
2 
(r = .40) ( .00061) 
Power = 3.42 + 12.04* Enroll + 7.09 *** Grants 
2 
(r = . 25) {6.18) (2.33) 
Committees = .0094 + .672*** Enroll + .131 *** Grants 
2 
(r = .50) ( .127) ( .048) 
Budget = -.0061 + .495*** Enroll + .216** Com. + .000702*** 
(.087) {.000131) 
EnrollxPar. 2 
(I'= .76) 
( . 094) 
Par. + .0100** 
( .0040) 
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Faculty= -.0036 + .661*** Enroll+ .139* Com. + .00044 Par. 
2 
(r = .81) ( .085) ( .078) ( .000120) 
*p~.10. 
**p~.05. 
***p~.01. 
Ti?f"ef"f"e-r-&-Maare-;-19sa-:-r;~645T ________________________ _ 
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Pfeffer &·Moore (1980) also observed that resources were 
more scarce at Campus A than at Campus B. They ran the same 
set of regression equations for each campus and found 
stronger effects of power and more variance in the 
distribution of power at Campus A. This seems to support the 
idea that power is used more often in resource allocation 
when resources are scarce. 
Pfeffer & Moore (1980) argued that analyzing the 
allocation of resources in an organization can provide a 
great deal of information about that particular institution. 
Research on organizations has barely begun to use budget 
and other forms of resource allocations to test 
organizational theories and issues. For example, it is 
possible to examine the magnitude of leadership effects 
by examining allocation changes when leaders change and 
to explore the conditions under which such effects vary. 
It is feasible to examine the effects of information 
systems on decision making by noting how changes in what 
is measured or how it is reported affect the apparent 
criteria that predict allocations. And, it is possible 
to examine the effects of changes in organizational 
structure, environmental constraints, and resource 
scarcity by exploring how the coefficients in a model 
of budget allocation vary both over time and in 
different contexts. (p. 652) 
Chaffee (1981) used the allocation of resources to study 
the dynamics of decision making at Stanford University. She 
replicated the work of Pfeffer & Salancik (1974), Hills & 
Mahoney (1978), and Pfeffer & Moore (1980) with Stanford's 
data. She used a different statistical procedure because 
she was dealing with a population rather than a sample and 
she was unable to break the funding years at Stanford into 
abundant and scarce periods. She looked at the data from 
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38 departments over a ten-year period. Also, when 
she used instructional units as an independent variable she 
lagged the instructiqnal units of one year into the next 
year's regression equation. Even with these exceptions and 
modifications, her results were very similar to the original 
studies. In the replication of Pfeffer & Salancik {1974) 
power and instructional units had a strong influence on 
resource allocation; however, the impact was not as great 
at Stanford as it was at Illinois. The replication of Hills 
& Mahoney {1978) confirmed the influence of the previous 
budget on the current budget. The replication of Pffefer & 
Moore {1980) confirmed that enrollment and power had 
significant influence on resource allocation, but it did not 
confirm the significance of paradigm development and the 
replication did not address the variable of contracts and 
grants provided to the institution. 
Chaffee {1981) argued that the universalistic variables, 
enrollment and instructional units, in the replications were 
indicators of a bureaucratic decision-making model rather 
than an indication of a rational model. She looked for 
indicators of a rational decision-making model at Stanford 
and found them in the planning and budgeting process of the 
Provost's Office; allocation decisions were made against 
explicit criteria in the pursuit of clearly established 
goals. Moreover, a comprehensive modeling and decision 
support system was used to minimize uncertainty. Chaffee 
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actually described rational strategic planning at the upper 
levels of Stanford University. This supports Allison's 
(1971) argument for the appropriate location for the 
application of the rational model in an organization. 
However, her description also revealed that the rational 
model was put in place through the routinized and personal 
charisma (Etzioni, 1961) of the Provost and his staff. The 
sources of their power were organization, expertise, and 
personality. Their primary power base was normative and 
their most effective instrument was persuasion in the 
acceptance of the values they wished to inculcate. They 
installed a rational decision-making model, but they created 
it with power not rationality. They developed specific 
evaluation criteria, but normative power, not rationality, 
determined the standards of excellence. 
Implications 2f !h~ Stugie~ 
All of the studies strongly suggest that power does 
affect resource allocation in higher education, but when and 
how power operates is affected by the internal and external 
environment of the organization; i.e., how much discretion do 
administrators have, how open is the allocation process, and 
how scarce and critical are the resources involved. Every 
study reviewed also indicates that bureaucratic criteria 
affect the the allocation of resources and I would argue that 
in some cases power is used to shape the bureaucratic 
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criteria to the advantage of the powerful. Power can also 
be used to create and support a rational model for resource 
allocation, but it must be used in a way that shapes values 
and develops commitment to the organization. Chaffee's 
{1981) study of decision making at Stanford supports the 
argument that alteration of belief or value is one of the 
most effective instruments of power in complex organizations 
{Etzioni, 1961; Galbraith, 1983). If power is used to shape 
values and norms, then the power structure or decision-making 
model which those values and norms support become legitimate 
in the organization (Pfeffer, 1981). 
There is a tremendous diversity within and among 
organizations. It is impossible for an administrator to 
adopt one action plan or management style which will be 
effective in all situations. Before any constructive change 
can be made in the organization, one needs to understand the 
organization as it actually functions. One needs to identify 
the most commonly used instruments of power, the bases of 
power, and the sources of power. One needs to understand the 
relationship among the rational, bureaucratic, and political 
elements of resource allocation. One needs to understand 
what goals are actually supported by the current pattern of 
resource allocation; one needs to understand the norms, 
values, and history of the organization; one needs to 
understand the theories of action of the organization. 
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CHAPTER IV 
USER ORIENTED METATHEORY 
In this chapter of the study the concept of theory 
of action and the perception and assessment of power are 
used to establish the rudiments of a user-oriented 
metatheory for management in higher education. A strategy 
for planned change in organizations is suggested that can be 
consistent with realities that administrators face in their 
institutions. 
This is a decision making model that focuses on the 
individual differences, perceptions, and strategies of the 
people in an organization. 
Theories of action are theories that can be expressed 
as follows: In situationS, if you intend consequence 
C, do A, given assumptions a1 ... aN. Theories of 
action exist as espoused theories and theories-in-use, 
which govern actual behavior. Theories-in-use tend to 
be tacit structures whose relation to action is like 
the relation of grammar-in-use to speech; they contain 
assumptions about self, others, and the environment -
these assumptions constitute a microcosm of science in 
everyday life. (Argyris & Schon, 1974, p. 30) 
Argyris & Schon (1974) argued that the espoused theory is 
how one predicts he would act. It is the theory of action 
to which the individual gives allegiance. His theory-in-use 
may or may not be compatible with his espoused theory and the 
69 
person may not be aware of the incompatibility. 
Argyris & Schon (1974), Argyris & Schon (1978), and 
Argyris (1982) argued that the prevailing theories-in-use 
in our society fit into a conceptual framework which they 
called Model I. The model consists of a set of governing 
variables, behavioral actions, and consequences for the 
behavioral world. Four governing variables were identified: 
define goals and achieve them, mal{imize winning and minimize 
losing, minimize generating or expressing negative feelings, 
and be rational. Four action or behavioral strategies were 
identified: design and manage the environment unilaterally, 
own and control the task, unilaterally protect self, and 
unilaterally protect others. These governing variables and 
action strategies generally produce consistent behavioral 
consequences. 
We can predict four consequences. (1) The actors will 
be defensive. Some ... will be authoritarian because 
they can exercise unilateral control over others. The 
others will fear their vulnerability and be overly 
concerned about themselves ... underconcerned with 
others. (2) Interpersonal and group relationships will 
become more defensive than facilitative. Group dynamics 
become more rigid and more a matter of winning/losing 
than collaboration. (3) Defensiveness in individuals, 
interpersonal relations, and group behavior will 
generate norms that support such behavior; norms such 
as conformity, antagonism, and mistrust will be 
generated rather than individuality, concern, and trust. 
(4) There will be little freedom to explore and search 
for alternatives, which is understandable given the 
first three consequences. Lack of freedom to explore 
and define goals, to explore new paths to these goals, 
and to set realistic but challenging levels of 
aspiration tends to little commitment to group decisions 
and little risk taking. (Argyris & Schon, 1974, p. 73) 
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Argyris & Schon (1974), Argyris & Schon (1978), and 
Argyris (1982) argued that there are two kinds of behavioral 
learning: learning to adopt new action strategies, i.e., 
single-loop learning, and learning to question or adopt 
new governing variables, i.e. double-loop learning. 
Double-loop learning does not replace single-loop learning; 
it complements it. Double-loop learning allows the 
individual to address nonroutine activities and decisions 
with more flexibility. Given the model I governing 
variables--action strategies and behavioral consequences, 
the learning that is possible for theories-in-use is, at 
best, single-loop, and, at worst, self-sealing; i.e., the 
assumptions of the theory-in-use are never tested. This 
limited ability to learn decreases the long-term 
effectiveness of model I theories-in-use. 
Argyris & Schon (1974), Argyris & Schon (1978), and 
Argyris (1982) indicated that model II theories-in-use are 
more effective for individual and organizational learning. 
Three governing variables were identified for model II 
theories-in-use: valid information, free and informed choice, 
and the internal commitment to choice and the constant 
monitoring of its implementation. Four action strategies 
were identified: design situations or environments where 
participants can experience high personal causation, control 
tasks jointly, make protection of self or others a joint 
operation, and address directly observable behavior. These 
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governing variables and action strategies produce behavioral 
consequences that are the opposite of model I 
theories-in-use. 
If individuals behave according to the governing 
variables and action strategies of model II, others will 
tend to see them as minimally defensive and open to 
learning, as facilitators, collaborators, and people 
who hold their theories-in-use firmly (because they are 
internally committed to them) but are equally committed 
to having them confronted and tested. Defensiveness 
in interpersonal and group relationships will tend to 
decrease, and people will tend to help others, have more 
open discussions, exhibit reciprocity, and feel free to 
explore different views and risky ideas. Moreover, 
group norms will tend away from defensiveness and toward 
growth and double loop learning; for example, trust, 
individuality, powersharing, and cooperation will tend 
to become the norms, with competition being confronted 
when it becomes dysfunctional. As these norms are 
emphasized, authenticity, autonomy, and internal 
commitment will tend to increase. (Argyris & Schon, 
1974, p. 91) 
To understand why resource allocation in higher 
education appears to have elements of rational, bureaucratic, 
and political decision-making models, one must understand the 
theories-in-use of th~ individual institution as they relate 
to resource allocation. To understand, predict, and control 
resource allocation so that it optimizes organizational 
effectiveness and learning, the organization must move toward 
the development of model II theories-in-use. The transition 
from complete reliance on model I theories-in-use to the 
addition of model II theories-in-use is difficult and centers 
around the ability to explicitly evaluate current 
theories-in-use for internal consistency, congruence with the 
espoused theory, testability, effectiveness, and the values 
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generated by the theory-in-use. The key issue seems to be 
the creation of conditions that facilitate double-loop 
learning, i.e., focusing on observable behavior and testing 
all inferences openly. This process can facilitate a change 
of the governing variables of the theories-in-use and move 
them toward Model II (Argyris, 1982). 
Efforts to create model II theories-in-use are most 
effective when they start at the top of the organization, but 
they can be successful in any subunit (Argyris & Schon, 
1978). Argyris (1982) argued that a coherent program of 
organizational development should be implemented to 
facilitate model II theories-in-use. The program should 
involve seminars for the managers on the theory and practice 
of double-loop learning and the periodic intervention of an 
external consultant to stimulate the process of double-loop 
learning. The key issues of the entire process seem to be 
using data not above the first level of inference, i.e., 
directly observable data, or the second level of inference, 
i.e., culturally understood and accepted meanings, and to 
publicly test any inference above the second level. I would 
argue that even second-level inferences need to be publicly 
tested in organizations that are becoming more heterogeneous 
because culturally understood and accepted meanings may 
differ across subcultures. One additional point should be 
emphasized. 
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Learning a theory of action so as to become competent 
in professional practice does not consist of learning to 
recite the theory; the theory of action has not been 
learned in the most important sense unless it can be 
put into practice. (Argyris & Schon, 1974, p. 12) 
Model II theories-in-use can be used to explain, 
predict, and possibly control the relationship between power 
and resource allocation because Model II can incorporate the 
rational, bureaucratic, and political elements of decision 
making. However, I would argue that a perceptual framework 
is needed to provide a common foundation to define what is 
observable data and to provide the parameters of culturally 
accepted meaning. One acceptable framework is open systems 
theory. The conceptual integration of the theory of action 
and the open systems perspective can produce what Keller 
(1983) identified as successful academic strategy. 
Strategic action recognizes that human nature is an 
amalgam of intellect, power plays, and emotions such as 
fear, envy, anger, compassion, greed, and the desire for 
purpose and meaning. So it gathers the best information 
and forecasts; struggles to overcome political 
jealousies, inertia, and sabotage; and builds 
psychological awareness and commitment. 
unapologetically, it marries rationality and 
artfulness, financial facts and politics. (p. 149) 
Nightingale & Toulouse (1977) presented an open system 
theory of organization in which the pattern and use of power 
are an integral part. The theory has five variables: 
environment, values, structures, process, and 
reactions-adjustments. The variable environment includes 
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cultural, political, economic, legal, and technological 
factors as well as the state of information about the 
organization. Values are abstract orientations that define 
acceptable beliefs and behavior. They also provide an 
underlying continuity for the beliefs and behavior in the 
organization. Structure is any formalized, routine, and 
officially sanctioned procedures through which the 
organization is administered. Process is the interpersonal 
and intergroup behavior that takes place within the defined 
structure of the organization. 
Communication upward, downward, and across the 
organizational hierarchy; face-to-face interaction among 
the members - for example, the encouragement of a best 
effort; interpersonal and intergroup conflict; bases of 
power; participation - that i9, informal influence which 
members have within the limitations imposed by the 
organization's structure; and promotion practices are 
examples of the process. (Nightingale & Toulouse, 1977, 
p. 265) 
Reactions-adjustments are feelings and attitudes of 
organizational members. For example, sense of alienation, 
trust in peers and superiors, satisfaction with 
organizational life, loyalty, and commitment to the 
organization. 
Nightingale & Toulouse (1977) argued that congruence 
will occur among the five variables. The reciprocal 
interactions among the last four variables--values, 
structure, process, and reactions-adjustments--push them 
toward congruence over time. Aspects of the environment 
affect the managerial value system of the organization and 
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elements of the organization•s structure. Broad cultural 
values and beliefs about authority, human nature, and work 
also affect the value system. Technological demands and 
constraints affect the structure of the organization. The 
managerial values system influences and is influenced by the 
structure and the process of the organization as well as 
the reactions-adjustments of the members of the organization. 
Each of the four variables within the framework of the 
organization affects and is affected by the others. For 
example, the way power is used in the process of the 
organization will over time affect not only the 
reactions-adjustments of the members of the organization 
but also the values and structures of the organization. 
Nightingale & Toulouse (1977) tested the theory in 
20 industrial organizations in Canada. The results of 
the study supported the hypothesized relationship and the 
strongest correlation was between the measures of process and 
reactions-adjustment. (The measures that were used are in 
the Appendix.) These results tend to support the intuitively 
obvious point, that the way people are treated in an 
organization will affect their loyalty and commitment to the 
organization. It is especially important in certain types of 
organizations, i.e., those that require highly skilled and 
independently functioning participants, that the members of 
the organization be committed to the values and major goals 
of the organization. In their case compliance is not enough; 
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compliance will not generate innovative or creative behavior. 
(Etzioni, 1961) 
There are a number of alternatives that can be used to 
apply Nightingale & Toulouse's conceptual frame~ork to the 
patterns of power and influence in higher education. One 
alternative is to use modified versions of the measures in 
the Appendix for the faculty, staff, and administrators 
of the institution and analyze the results by group. Will 
the three groups share the same goals? Will they share the 
same values? What will be the most common base of power? 
Are the faculty satisfied or alienated? 
Another alternative is to use standardized instruments 
designed for higher education to address the same issues. 
Two suitable sets of instruments are the Institutional Goals 
Inventory (IGI) and the Institutional Functioning Inventory 
(IFI). The IGI is a standardized survey for the various 
constituent groups of a college or university. The survey 
elicits reactions to over 90 institutional goals as they 
are and as they should be. The instrument has additional 
space for up to 20 goals developed at the institution and 
six supplementary questions. The IFI asks faculty, students, 
and administrators for their perceptions of the institution 
on 11 scales: intellectual-aesthetic extracurriculum, 
freedom, human diversity, concern for improvement of society, 
concern for undergraduate learning, democratic governance, 
meeting local needs, self-study and planning, concern for 
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advancing knowledge, concern for innovation, and 
institutional esprit (Educational Testing Service, 1972). 
A third alternative is suggested by the work of Alderfer 
& Smith (1982). They combined intuitive analysis of the 
organization with survey research. They argued that any data 
that are collected about an organization are not only a 
function of the theory used but also a function of the method 
used to collect the data. Moreover, the method has a 
stronger direct influence on the data than theory. Their 
work focused on intergroup relationships in organizations. 
They argued that the groups in an organization can be 
divided into two classes: identity and organizational groups. 
An identity group may be thought of as one whose members 
share common biological characteristics (such as sex), 
have participated in equivalent historical experiences 
(such as migration), are subjected currently to certain 
social forces (such as unemployment), and as a result 
have similar world views. When people enter 
organizations, they bring along their identity groups, 
which are based on variables such as ethnicity, sex, 
age, and family. (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, p. 38) 
An organizational group may be conceived of as a group 
whose members share approximately common organizational 
positions, participate in equivalent work experiences, 
and consequently have similar organizational views. 
Organizations assign members to organizational groups 
according to division of labor and hierarchy of 
authority. One critical factor in intergroup relations 
in organizations is that membership in identity groups 
is not independent from membership in organizational 
groups. (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, p. 38) 
The last point simply means that membership in certain 
!§entity groups limit the organizational groups that one can 
enter. Both types of groups share five common 
characteristics: 
1. interdependent relations within the group, 
2. perceive themselves as a group, 
3. recognized as a group by others, 
4. interdependent relationships with other groups, and 
5. roles in the group are a function of member and 
expectations. 
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Alderfer & Smith (1982) used microcosm groups as a 
major tool in studying the characteristics of the intergroup 
relations within the organization. A microcosm group is a 
sample of the identity and organizational groups that are 
relevant to an issue that is of concern. The microcosm 
group should contain no more than 12 members at any one 
time, but the membership should vary over time as the issues 
in the organization change. Alderfer & Smith used the 
mechanism to study group relations, but the procedure could 
be used to study or assess any process variables in the 
organization. 
Discussions with the microcosm group are where the 
intuitive identification of the characteristics of relevant 
process variables would be defined and developed. Survey 
instruments would be developed and pilot tested with the 
group. The surveys would be modified based on the feedback 
from the group so that the substance and style of the 
instrument would be relevant to the internal reality of the 
organization. When the survey of the organization was 
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completed the results would be reviewed and discussed 
by the microcosm group. The basic idea behind the use of 
the microcosm group is that not only is the data collected 
more accurate and valid but also the method itself creates 
more involvement and commitment to the organization; i.e., 
the method of identifying the process of the organization 
also improves the process of the organization. A microcosm 
group is usually more effective if an external consultant 
works with the group directly and collaborates with the 
internal managers on the interventions that will be 
implemented. It lends itself to the testing of assumptions 
and inferences and could provide the environment to initiate 
the type of double-loop learning that is necessary for the 
development of an effective theory of action. 
lm.J2lic~ti.Qns .Qf Pow~!:_ 
One issue that should be dealt with explicitly when 
analyzing the patterns of power in the process of an 
organization is that power is also the ability to thwart the 
planned behavior of others. In many complex organizations 
the participants need only not cooperate fully, i.e., 
simply comply in terms of their external behavior, in order 
to stymie the goals and the objectives of the management of 
the organization. This behavior is often the type of 
countervailing power that develops when coercive and 
remunerative power bases are used excessively. The 
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participants in the organization can not really influence or 
shape the behavior of the authorities, i.e., those who can 
enforce binding decisions; they simply frustrate them 
(Gamson, 1968). In this case, this degenerates into "working 
to the rule'', i.e., only doing the minimum that the formal 
structure and procedures require. No institution of higher 
education can function effectively over time if a significant 
number of the members of the organization simply work to the 
rule. 
What Galbraith (1983) called conditioned power, i.e. the 
use of a normative power base, is the one most effective 
means of power in complex organizations (Etzioni, 1961). It 
does not generate countervailing power and is not zero sum 
in its nature (Galbraith, 1983). The most common pragmatic 
criterion for power is whether it will accomplish the desired 
objective in the short term. However, the most important 
criteria should be the long-term impact on the values, 
structure, and reactions-adjustments of the organization. 
Power should be used to improve organizational effectiveness. 
Cameron (1978) pointed out that organizational 
effectiveness in higher education is multidimensional, i.e., 
external dimensions, morale dimensions, and student-oriented 
dimensions. The concept of equifinality suggests that there 
is more than one way to reach the desired goal, 
organizational effectiveness (Katz & Kahn, 1966). However, 
open systems theory also suggests that the ability to adapt 
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appropriately to the external and internal environment--i.e., 
innovation--is a major criterion for organizational 
effectiveness. Davis, Strand, Alexander, & Hussain (1982) 
argued that innovation is a function of the organizational 
environment and the characteristics of the individuals within 
the organization. However, they make this point. 
In the early stages of the innovation process, 
innovators clearly perceive their motivation as the 
primary or most important factor of the change process. 
(p. 584) 
If any institution of higher education is to be innovative 
and effective, it must have committed and motivated faculty 
and staff. Their reactions-adjustments to the process of the 
organization must be generally positive. The value system 
and structure of the organization must be constructive. Th~ 
appropriate use of power can achieve these ends. An 
administrator must use power constructively in a coherent 
theory of action to have a high probability of organizational 
effectiveness (Pettigrew, 1975; Argyris, 1982). 
This chapter suggests some basic guidelines for 
administrators in higher education: 
1. Develop a theory-in-use which is explicit and 
consistent with the espoused theory of action; 
2. Encourage an environment that supports double-loop 
learning; 
3. Assess the process of your organization, especially 
power, and its impact on the total organization; 
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4. Involve students, faculty, staff, and consultants 
in the assessment of the process of the organization and 
in the process of double-loop learning. 
5. Maintain an open system perspectiye which accepts all 
sorts of data as legitimate; and maintain an awareness 
for new variables and relationships. 
It is important to keep in mind that the perceptions of 
power are not only a function of the sources, bases, and 
instruments of power but also the assumptions of the 
perceiver. The guidelines indicate a broad road to a level 
of perception of the organization that is often only reached 
by a narrow and hidden path of intuition. Each of the 
studies in Chapter III on the relationship between power and 
resource allocation had slightly different definitions of 
power and determinants of power; each study illustrated 
slightly different relationships among the rational, 
bureaucratic, and political criteria of resource allocation; 
each study described an organizational environment that had 
differential affects on the interaction between power and 
resource allocation. An efficient administrator should be 
able to use all the instruments of power; the individual 
should be able to influence the access of individuals and 
subunits to the sources of power. However, only a 
realistic perception of the organization can make these 
actions effective. An administrator needs a theory of action 
that allows the individual to learn and grow. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
~gmm~~Y 
The problem this theoretical study addressed was that 
while many of the models for planning, management, 
and resource allocation are based on the assumptions 
of rational decision making, the administrative reality of 
most institutions of higher education is not completely 
rational. The goals are not always clear; alternatives are 
often not clearly defined; actions are implemented that 
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do not optimize the stated goals of the institution. 
Administrative reality is a mix of rationality, bureaucracy, 
and politics. The prescriptive models that many 
administrators are taught do not match the organizational 
realities that those same administrators must face. 
Administrators develop theories-in-use, working models 
that actually govern their behavior. Theories-in-use are 
often tacit; the individual may or may not be aware of what 
actually governs his behavior. Moreover, the theory-in-use 
may not be consistent with the individual's espoused theory, 
the theory to which the administrator gives his allegiance. 
As long as the theory-in-use is not explicit, it is 
difficult to verify the effectiveness of the theory-in-use 
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in promoting organizational health and development. 
The research reviewed in this study suggests that in 
several cases the theory-in-use for resource allocation did 
not match the espoused theory. The espoused theory was 
rational planning; the theory-in-use appeared to be a 
combination of rational, bureaucratic, and political 
elements. The particular theory-in-use varied from 
institution to institution, but all of them seemed to have 
the same combination of elements. Also, in each 
organization some form of power played a significant part in 
the theory-in-use of resource allocation. 
Power is a pervasive and complex organizational 
variable. It can have a variety of bases, sources, and 
·instruments, but its use always affects all the major 
elements of the organization. Power in the organization 
must be understood if one wishes to develop an 
organizationally effective model II theory-in-use that is 
explicit and consonant with the espoused theory of the 
organization. Building this type of theory-in-use can be 
done most effectively by focusing on observable behavior and 
testing assumptions and inferences. An open systems view 
helps define what is observable and helps determine what are 
acceptable inferences. Building an effective model II 
theory-in-use is the beginning of one's personal metatheory 
of management. 
QQnQl~siQn~ 
In Chapter I of this study two questions were asked: 
1. How does power affect resource allocation in 
institutions of higher education? 
2. How does one conceptualize and assess power in 
institutions of higher education? 
The review and analysis of the literature indicate several 
answers to these questions. 
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1. Power affects resource allocation in institutions of 
higher education in combination with bureaucratic, 
political, and rational factors. 
2. Power is used most often when resources are scarce 
and critical and when the decision-making process is 
closed and ambiguous. 
3. Power is a11 integral part of any organization. It 
has several sources: organization, property, 
personality, expertise, and opportunity; four bases: 
coercion, remuneration, norms, and knowledge; and three 
instruments: sanction/threat, reward(promise, and 
alteration of belief/value. 
4. Power is best assessed through a combination of 
intuitive and logical analysis and survey research. 
This process can not only give insights into the nature 
and use of power but also give some indication of the 
reaction and affect of power. 
5. The assessment of power is most effective when it 
is done cooperatively with the members of the 
organization in microcosm groups, i.e., samples of 
the groups significant to the process. 
6. A model II theory-in-use allows the testing of 
assumptions underlying the use of power in the 
organization. 
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1. Double-loop learning, i.e., learning which tests and 
changes the governing variables of a theory-in-use, is 
essential for the development of model II 
theories-in-use. 
R~£Qmm~n£~1i£!!.§. 
The analysis of the literature reviewed in this study 
produced a number of recommendations not only for 
administrators in higher education but also for the education 
of administrators. The recommendations for administrators 
involve guidelines for the development of their own user 
oriented management theory. The recommendations for the 
education of administrators deal with guidelines for the 
development of an effective curriculum. There are five 
recommendations for administrators: 
1. develop a coherent theory of action in which your 
theory-in-use is explicit and consistent with your 
espoused theory; 
2. encourage an environment that supports double-loop 
learning; make it possible for governing variables, 
basic assumptions, to be questioned and changed; 
3. assess the process of your organization, especially 
power, and its impact on key organizational functions, 
e.g. resource allocation; 
4. involve others--faculty, staff, students, and 
external consultants--in the assessment process of the 
organization and in the process of double-loop 
learning; 
5. maintain a perspective and an organizational 
.heterogeneity which allows you to collect relevant 
information from a wide variety of sources and which 
allows you to discover new relationships. 
There are four recommendations for the education of 
administrators: 
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1. The curriculum should teach the skills necessary for 
the development of a cohesive theory of action. Three 
basic skills are involved: diagnosis of the internal and 
external environment, testing of theories-in-use and 
assumptions, and understanding and accepting one's 
personal causality. In order to maintain a competent 
performance administrators must understand the history 
and current situation of their organization; they need 
to be aware of the theories-in-use and continually test 
them for appropriateness and effectiveness; and they 
must understand their role as a technical and 
interpersonal instrument in the organization. 
2. The curriculum should provide exposure to a wide 
variety of theoretical perspectives and require the 
integration of several of the perspectives into a 
proposed theory of action. 
3. The curriculum should provide an opportunity for 
double-loop learning in as many courses as possible so 
that double-loop learning will become a basic part of 
the administrators' repertoire of behavior. 
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4. The curriculum should provide an opportunity for the 
students and faculty to test their theories-in-use. 
Simulations, case studies, and role playing may be 
required, but an effective theory of action has not 
been learned until it can be practiced. 
Concluding Statement 
Management in higher education is a combination of art 
and science. Despite the professional education of many 
administrators, the practice of management is often learned 
through apprenticeship. This process may have been 
acceptable in a relatively stable environment, but in 
increasingly complex organizations that exist in a rapidly 
changing environment managers can not rely on what 
their mentor did. 
Administrators must be able to reconstruct the reality 
of their organization and be able to test the validity of the 
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vision. Administrators must be able to understand not 
only how power affects their organization but also how to use 
power to make the organization more effective. 
Administrators need to understand whether they practice what 
they say they believe and to understand how their practice 
affects the values and commitment of the people they affect. 
Administrators need to test their assumptions and values and 
to know what to hold and what to let go. The professional 
education of administrators, whether it is formal or 
in-service education, should prepare them for these tasks. 
It should teach them the art, the science, and the practice 
of management and the ability to continually educate 
themselves. 
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APPENDIX 
Measures of Concepts from Nightingale and Toulouse (1977) 
The values questions were introduced by the following 
statements: 11 Be1ow are Listed a number of statements. There 
are no right or wrong answers to these statements. We are 
interested only in your opinion about each statement." Each 
question was measured on a five point scale, which ranged 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
1. Index consisting of average responses to three questions: 
A good superior discourages his subordinates from talking to 
him about their personal problems. A superior should give 
his subordinates only that info~nation which is necessary for 
them to do their tasks. The more a superior grants the 
requests of his subordinates, the more he loses authority. 
2. Most people work best under close supervision. 
3. A superior should always explain his decisions to his 
subordinates. 
4. Generally, one must learn to be cautious with relations 
with others. 
5. A superior can not afford to make mistakes. 
6. Most people today try to work as little as possible. 
7. Group goal setting offers advantages that can not be 
obtained by individual goal setting. 
The structure questions were introduced by the 
statements: 11 The following statements may be either true or 
false as they apply to your job. On the scale, describe the 
extent to which each statement applies to your company." A 
four point scale ranging from definitely true to definitely 
false was used except where indicated otherwise. 
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Measures 
1. Task definition index: Everyone has a specific job to do. 
There is a complete job description for my job. 
2. Job codification index: First, I feel that I am my own 
boss in most matters. Employees are often permitted to use 
their own judgement as to how to handle various problems. A 
person can make his own decisions here without checking with 
anybody else. People here are allowed to do almost as they 
please. 
3. Rules observation index: The organization keeps a written 
record of everyone's job performance. Going through proper 
channels is constantly stressed. Written orders from higher 
up are followed without questions. Employees are constantly 
being checked on for rule violations. People here feel that 
they are constantly being watched to see that they obey the 
rules. 
4. Rules orientation measure: Whatever situation arises, we 
have procedures to follow in dealing with it. 
5. Variety of work measure: One thing people like around here 
is the variety of work. 
6. Slope and control curve: influence of the plant manager 
and his executive board minus the influence of the workers as 
a group, measured on a five point scale ranging from very 
little influence to a great deal of influence. 
7. Height of control curve: index of average influence of 
three groups measured on a five point scale: the plant 
manager and his executive board, all other managerial and 
supervisory personnel, and the workers as a group. 
8. Hierarchy of authority index: A person who wants to make 
his own decisions would be quickly discouraged here. Even 
small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a 
final answer. 
Process questions were measured on four or five point 
scales. Measures us five point scales unless noted 
otherwise. 
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1. Positive bases of promotion index: 
a. quality of work 
b. quantity of work 
c. supervisor's opinion 
d. dependability 
e. creativeness, inventiveness, and taking initiative 
f. having good professional knowledge 
(importance ranges from not at all to very great) 
2. Negative bases of promotion index: 
a. having friends and relatives in higher management 
b. recommendations of a political or a religious nature 
c. ethnic considerations 
d. (importance ranges from not at all to very great) 
3. Promotion based on seniority in the plant. 
(importance ranges from not at all to very great) 
4. To what extent do persons in their work group encourage 
each other to give their best effort. 
(To a very great extent ... not at all) 
5. When decisions are made, are the the people affected asked 
for their opinion and suggestions? 
{almost never asked ... almost always asked: four point 
scale) 
6. Is there a free flow of communication existing downward? 
{to a very great extent ... not at all) 
7. Is there a free flow of communication existing upward? 
{to a very great extent ... not at all) 
B. Is there free flow of communication existing sidewise? 
{to a very great extent ... not at all) 
9. To what extent are you told what you need to know to do 
your job in the best possible way? 
(to a very great extent ... not at all) 
10. Do you know how your job fits into the functioning of 
this plant? 
(I do not know at all ... I know completely) 
11. In working with other departments, problems are bound to 
arise from time to time. When these problems occur, to what 
extent are they handled well? 
{to a very great extent ... not at all) 
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12. From time to time, major changes in policies, procedures, 
or equipment are introduced by this company. Generally, how 
do these changes work out? 
(changes of this kind are always an improvement ... they 
are never an improvement) 
13. How much strain or stress do these changes create for the 
people who work in this company? 
(extremely high strain ... no strain at all) 
The following bases of power questions were introduced by the 
statement: "when you do what your immediate supervisor 
requests you to do on the job, why do you do it?'' , and were 
measured on a five point scale. 
(not at all ... to a very great extent) 
14. I respect his competence and judgement. 
15. He can give special help and benefits. 
16. He is a nice guy. 
17. He can penalize or otherwise disadvantage me. 
18. It is my duty. 
19. It is necessary if the organization is to function 
properly. (Nightingale & Toulouse, 1977, p. 277-279) 
Reactions-adjustments 
1. Index of alienation: average score of ten statements 
answered on a five point scale ranging from very true to very 
untrue. 
a. Men like me can not influence the course of events; 
only men in high positions can ~ave such influence. 
b. I have never had the influence over others that I 
would like. 
c. Public affairs are so complicated that it is 
impossible to orient oneself to them. 
d. Despite the many advantages science has made, life 
today is too complicated. 
e. Life seems to be moving on without rules or order. 
f. Nowadays, it is hard to know right from wrong. 
g. It is not possible to rely on others. 
h. Today it is practically impossible to find real 
friends because everyone thinks only of himself. 
i. I can never do what I really like because 
circumstance require that I do otherwise. 
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j. Life is so routinized that I do not have a chance to 
use my true abilities. (Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Wieser, 
Rosner, & Vianello, 1974, p. 159-160) 
2. All in all, how satisfied are you with your job? 
(not at all ... very much) 
3. Index of ideal-actual participation: When decisions are 
being made should (are) the people asked for their opinions 
and suggestions? 
(They should (are) almost never asked for their opinions 
and suggestions ... they should (are) almost always 
asked for their opinions and suggestions) 
4. Index of ideal-actual personal control: How much influence 
do (should) you actually have on what happens in this plant? 
(very little influence ... a very great deal of 
influence) 
5. To what extent do you really feel responsible for the 
success of your own work group? 
(not at all ... very much) 
6. To what extent do you really feel responsible for the 
success of your department? 
(not at all ... very much) 
7. To what extent do you really feel responsible for the 
success of the whole plant? 
(not at all ... very much) 
8. What are the attitudes of company members toward plant 
management? 
(attitudes are strongly opposed ... attitudes strongly 
support management: four point scale) 
9. Do you think responsible people have a real interest in 
the welfare of those who work here? 
(they have no interest at all ... they have a very great 
interest) 
10. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in your 
superior? 
(to a very great extent ... not at all) 
11. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in the 
persons in your work group? 
(to a very great extent ... not at all) 
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12. Do you feel free to discuss personal problems with your 
!~mediate superior? 
(to a very great extent ... not at all) 
(Nightingale & Toulouse, 1977, p. 279-280) 
